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Racial Residential Segregation and Social Control:
A Panel Study of the Variation in Police Strength
Across U.S Cities, 1980–2010
Stephanie L. Kent & Jason T. Carmichael
Abstract Despite a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention given to racial
residential segregation and its influence on a number of social problems in the United
States, few scholars have examined the role that this persistent form of racial
inequality plays in shaping the magnitude of formal social control efforts. Our study
examines this relationship by assessing the potential influence that the isolation of
minorities may have on efforts to control crime in urban centers across the United
States. Using a pooled time-series regression technique well suited for the analysis of
aggregate, longitudinal data, we assess the potential influence of racial segregation on
the size of municipal police departments in 170 U.S. cities between 1980 and 2010.
After accounting for minority group size, economic threat, crime, and disorganiza-
tion, we find that racial residential segregation has a significant non-linear effect on
police force size. Cities with the most racially integrated populations have the
smallest police presence but at very high levels of segregation, police strength levels
off. This finding is consistent with expectations derived from the contact hypothesis.
Under such conditions, majority group members appear to be less inclined to demand
greater crime control measures such as increased police protection. Period interac-
tions with residential segregation also suggest that this relationship has grown
stronger in each decade since 1980. Overall, our study provides strong support for
threat theories and the contact hypothesis but offers necessary refinements.
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Despite efforts to de-segregate racially divided cities during and after the post civil
rights era, racial residential segregation remains a pervasive feature of the social
landscape in many U.S. cities. The persistent residential segregation of minorities has
been linked to a number of social ills. Sociological studies, for instance, have
examined the role of segregation in producing higher rates of infant mortality
(McFarland & Smith, 2011), and as a catalyst for the recent foreclosure crisis,
whereby cities with high concentrations of minorities were targeted by subprime
lenders who marketed risky loans to minority clients (Rugh & Massey, 2010). A
rather small number of important studies have also examined the role that racial
residential segregation may play in explaining why and when formal social control
mechanisms may be employed. According to these studies, higher levels of
residential segregation have been associated with greater arrest rates of
African Americans (Liska & Chamlin, 1984), the size of municipal police
departments (Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Liska, Lawrence & Sanchirico, 1982), the
jail population (Carmichael, 2005), and the prison population (Liska, Lawrence
& Benson, 1981).
Of all aspects related to the criminal justice system, perhaps the most integral
element related to the maintenance of social order is police presence. Yet the potential
effect of segregation on the size of police forces is largely underexplored. Perhaps this
is because nearly all of the prior research on police strength has overwhelmingly
attributed changes in police size to the sheer size of racial minority groups, that is,
jurisdictions with larger minority populations have the most police. But these studies
rarely take into account the geographic distribution of this population across a city
and how the residential isolation of minorities may influence how police are used.
While some recent scholarship considered the impact of racial residential segre-
gation on police force size in the United States (e.g. Sever, 2001; Kent & Jacobs,
2005; Stults & Baumer, 2007), these studies treat it largely as a control variable in
their models. The results from these studies are dated, with only two studies using
data from 2000, so they may not reflect current cultural and political conditions in the
U.S. Additionally, no prior study has examined the theoretically derived possibility
that segregation may have a non-linear association with the size of municipal police
departments. If a non-linear relationship does exist between these two factors, results
from previous scholarship on police strength would be biased by misspecification. To
overcome these limitations, this study will assess theoretical claims regarding the
potential non-linear association between racial residential segregation and crime
control strategies while simultaneously accounting for several other factors such as
crime rates and racial and ethnic composition.
Despite arguments to the contrary, there are reasons to believe that race relations in
the United States have not improved enough to eliminate discriminatory practices
against minorities. Even the most recent studies of police strength, for instance,
overwhelmingly show that a substantial amount of the variation in police force size
is explained by the size of the minority population (McCarty, Ren & Zhao, 2012;
Zhao, Ren & Lovrich, 2012). The theoretical impetus for this relationship comes from
the racial threat perspective offered by Blalock (1967) which proposes that as the
political or economic threat posed by minority groups grows, dominant group
members respond by demanding additional social control resources. While racial
and ethnic threat hypotheses enjoy substantial empirical support, if we stop here, we
risk missing important nuances of racial threat. In particular, it is necessary to
consider the well-established association between racial segregation and racial com-
position (Blauner, 1972). Indeed, in their analysis of segregation in 1981, 1991, and
2001, South, Crowder, and Pais found that whites are more likely to self-segregate in
cities with large black populations (2011) suggesting that both the size and distribu-
tion of racial minority groups are intrinsically linked in urban society.
Scholarship examining the association between police strength and levels of
residential segregation has reported inconsistent findings. Some studies have reported
a positive finding while others a negative association between these two factors.
Further confusing the situation, different theoretical accounts are offered by scholars
to account for their results regardless of the direction they find. One line of thinking is
that greater interracial contact in de-segregated cites reduces prejudice and negative
stereotypes of minorities among Whites. Alternatively, greater contact between racial
groups may emphasize group differences and, thereby, increase racial intolerance
tolerance (see DeFina & Hannon, 2009 for a thorough review of findings that support
these two perspectives). In any case, this debate is central to the literature on a variety
of social control outcomes, including race disparities in arrest (Ousey & Lee, 2008),
jail admissions (Carmichael, 2005), and the size of municipal police forces (Kent &
Jacobs, 2005; Stults & Baumer, 2007) because racial threat theory posits that both the
size and the spatial distribution of minority groups should influence criminal justice
responses that disproportionately target racial and ethnic minorities (Blalock, 1967).
Our aim here is to provide some needed theoretical clarity to this debate by testing
different specification of this association between racial residential segregation and
the size of metropolitan police departments across the United States.
While we focus on residential segregation, we also test alternative hypothe-
ses that explain the variation in the size of local police departments in major
U.S. cities over the last several decades. We review these theoretical accounts
and their resulting hypotheses in the following section. We then test the
strength of these hypotheses using a fixed-effects, pooled time-series analysis
of the largest 170 cities in the U.S. between 1980 and 2010. This rigorous
methodology allows an investigation of multiple explanations and tests for
nonlinear and time-specific interaction effects. The results should help clarify
the disparate findings reported in the prior literature and improve our under-
standing of how race influences levels of social control in modern society.
Theorizing Police Strength
Racial and Ethnic Threat
As noted above, studies of police strength overwhelmingly report a strong positive
effect of the size of minority populations on the size of municipal police forces. The
theoretical justification for this relationship comes from Blalock (1967), who argued
that majority groups increase efforts to maintain their social and political dominance
as the size of the minority group grows, until it exceeds a certain proportion of the
total population. This racial threat theory assumes that citizens and authorities
perceive members of racial and ethnic minority groups as a criminal threat to the
social order (Tittle & Curran, 1988). This is not surprising given that the literature on
racial prejudice supports the proposition that whites who are exposed to blacks are
more likely to believe in stereotypes that see blacks as criminal threats. Other
sociological studies reveal that whites in cities with more African Americans are
more fearful of crime (Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Quillian & Pager, 2001).
Furthermore, the most racially prejudiced Whites tend to have more punitive attitudes
about crime (Cohen, Barkan, & Halterman, 1991). It follows that majority whites
who espouse these views will demand increases in social control, including hiring
more police.
Nearly all macro-level studies of police strength support this contention.
Jackson (1989), and Nalla, Lynch, and Leiber (1997) show that minority group
threat leads to increased expenditures on police while other research reports the
same effect on the number of police officers per capita (Jacobs, 1979; Liska et
al., 1981; Sever, 2001; Sharp, 2006; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Holmes, Smith,
Freng & Munoz, 2008; McCarty et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012). These studies
show that when blacks make up a large proportion of the population, control
efforts are strengthened regardless of the crime rate, suggesting that cities with
a larger percentage of African Americans will have more police.
Some of the above studies further investigate this relationship by testing whether
the relationship between the size of the Black population and levels of social control
is non-linear. Jackson and Carroll (1981) reported a curvilinear effect of the percent
black on government spending on the police, and Kent and Jacobs (2005) and Stucky
(2005) found this effect on police force size suggesting that the “threat” felt by whites
is highest in places with a moderate minority population, but less apparent in
communities with low or very high proportions of racial or ethnic minorities. Sever
(2001) found that percent black was non-significant in a subsample of cities that had
less than 30 %. Stults and Baumer (2007) found a curvilinear effect of the
percentage Black on police force size with a tipping point around 30 %.
Some of these scholars argue that as minority populations grow, they gain the
political power necessary to counter attempts to use city level politics to
respond to perceived racial threat. Based on these findings and the compelling
theoretical assumption, we predict that the number of police will expand as
African-Americans comprise a higher proportion of a city’s general population
but may have trivial effects once a threshold has been reached.
But other minority groups may also influence the size of municipal police
departments. Dating back to Jackson (1989), who reported a significant rela-
tionship between the percentage of Hispanics and police expenditure in cities, a
handful of studies of police strength tested an ethnic version of racial threat
operationalized by the percentage of Hispanics. This relationship is plausible
since in some cities, Hispanics occupy the largest minority group. According to
threat theories, whites should also respond to perceived threat posed by this
group by demanding additional social control.
The results of studies that tested this assumption, however, have been mixed. Both
Stucky (2005) and Kent and Jacobs (2005), for example, found positive effects of the
percentage of Hispanics on police strength in cities while Zhao et al. (2012) found a
negative effect and Sever (2001) no effect. Analyzing only cities in the Southwestern
U.S., Holmes et al.’s, 2008 study of police strength did reveal a positive but
surprisingly small effect. In fact, Holmes et al. (2008) and Kent and Jacobs (2005)
reported that the effect of racial (African-American) threat was much more pro-
nounced than the ethnic threat posed by Hispanics. But all of these studies are now
dated and do not capture the recent growth in the Hispanic population. Since no study
has yet tested this version of the theory using 2010 data, and given the substantial
increases in the Hispanic population in the U.S. in recent years, we hypothesize that
cities with a larger percentage of Hispanics will have more police.
Racial Residential Segregation
The above explanation focuses on the relative size of racial or ethnic minority groups,
but the physical distribution of minority groups within a city should also affect the
allocation of policing resources. An examination of segregation is a logical extension
of and complement to the above version of racial threat when we consider the effect
segregation has on interracial contact. Allport’s (1954) classic contact hypothesis
suggests that racial integration reduces inter-group hostility and prejudice. Thus,
when Whites and African-Americans have more contact as a result of residential
integration, whites are less likely to hold negative perceptions of racial minorities. A
substantial body of literature now supports this claim. For instance, Welch, Sigelman,
Bledsoe and Combs (2001), in their longitudinal study of Detroit, found that resi-
dential integration promotes interracial contact and reduces interracial hostility
suggesting that negative attitudes can be attenuated through increased exposure to
different types of communities. Whites who live in highly segregated neighborhoods
and are only exposed to racial minorities through the mass media are likely to hold
erroneous stereotypes (Dyer, Vedlitz, & Worchel 1989; Lee 2000; Hum & Zonta,
2000).
Applied to racial threat theory, the increased interracial contact provided by
reduced residential segregation should diminish perceived threat posed by minority
groups. It stands to reason that a reduction in whites’ fear of unfamiliar racial groups
would decrease their demands for increased social control efforts that largely target
minorities. Put differently, in the most segregated places in which whites and racial
minorities rarely interact, white fear and the resulting punitive responses to perceived
threat should be greatest because the interpersonal interracial relationships that may
have dispelled these stereotypes are reduced.
Recent scholarship suggests that police administrators do, in fact, respond to
highly segregated and concentrated areas of racial minorities by hiring additional
police (Stults & Baumer, 2007; Sever, 2001). Sever’s (2001) study of municipal
police departments showed that black-white segregation had a positive effect on the
number of sworn officers in 1980 but not on expenditures on the police. He
contended that police administrators are threatened by the presence or increase of
highly segregated African-American neighborhoods, and, given the substantial influ-
ence they have on decisions about funding allocation for additional hires, will
respond by adding more police. Therefore it is plausible that it is the concentration
of racial minorities, rather than only changes in the mere presence of this racial group,
that leads to increases in police strength.
While most of the studies discussed above suggest a linear relationship between
residential segregation and the size of the police department, this relationship may be
more complex. It is plausible that the direction of the effect of segregation depends on
the overall level of segregation. Just as the size of the minority population has a
“tipping point” in which racial threat is attenuated once the minority population
exceeds a certain percentage of the population, perhaps segregation has a similar
effect. Specifically, it seems plausible that cities would add police in response to the
threat posed by a segregated minority, but after a certain threshold is reached, the
perceived danger of this group becomes less apparent because they are so distant and
isolated. There are theoretical accounts to support such a claim. Wacquant (2001)
proposes that both criminal justice mechanisms and the isolation of African-
Americans in urban ghettos serve as social controls that maintain racial discrimina-
tion. Blalock (1967), for instance, proposed that extreme levels of racial residential
segregation serve as a buffer that attenuates the threat perceived by whites because
contact between races is minimized. Restrictive residential arraignments may limit
the amount of contact between Whites and minorities (even if the minority population
is large) because segregation geographically isolates minorities into urban ghettos far
from most Whites. This residential isolation should, in turn, diminsh white perception
of the risk of interracial victimization and thereby reduce dominant group fear of
crime. In other words, racial residential segregation largely eliminates the need for
aggressive social control because dominant group fears about interracial crime are
reduced without the need for alternative measures of social control (Blauner, 1972;
Spitzer, 1975; South & Felson, 1990). If that is the case, places with the highest levels
of segregation should have less need for larger police departments.
There are other theoretically derived reasons to believe that very high levels of
residential segregation will lead to a reduction in police force size. The “benign
neglect” hypothesis, for instance, proposes that law enforcement agencies police
neighborhoods with high concentrations of racial minorities less aggressively because
police are more responsive to interracial crime and less likely to respond to the
intraracial crime most likely found in these communities (Liska et al., 1981). More
recently, Myer and Chamlin, (2011) explored this theory at the police district level
in one large city, and reported evidence of benign neglect in the most econom-
ically disadvantaged minority neighborhood. Additional empirical research sup-
ports a negative relationship between segregation and social control mechanisms
in the criminal justice system. Kent and Jacobs (2005) found fewer police
officers in cities in which a substantial black population is residentially isolated
from areas where whites reside.
In sum, the above discussion suggests that the relationship between residential
segregation may be non-linear. Following the contact hypothesis, cities with the most
integrated populations should have the fewest police officers. According to the threat
hypothesis, as minorities become more isolated, prejudice and negative stereotypes
flourish. Subsequently, dominant group fears of minorities grow, and greater demands
for formal social control presumably follow. However, Blalock’s version of the
threat hypothesis predicts that the effect of racial threat should subside once
some high threshold in residential segregation has been reached. We therefore
propose that segregated cities should have more police, but at extreme levels of
segregation, there will be a reduction in police strength. Support for this model
would be found if the squared term yields a significantly negative coefficient,
while the non-squared term is significantly positive.
Finally, segregation in urban areas is a dynamic process. Indeed, there is consid-
erable literature devoted to measuring and explaining changes in residential segrega-
tion over time in the United States. From 1980 to 2010 (the period examined
here), whites in metropolitan areas are more likely to be exposed to nonwhites,
though the opposite trend has been observed for African-Americans (South et
al., 2011). Therefore, we consider the possibility that any effect of segregation
on police strength may not be stable over time.
Economic Threat
While most of the police strength literature focuses on racial threat, an economic
threat explanation may be just as plausible. Stemming from conflict theories of social
order, social control mechanisms in an unequal society such as the United States may
be used in a discriminatory way that serves to reproduce and maintain a socioeco-
nomic structure that favors the affluent at the expense of the poor. This perspective
complements the racial threat theory because race and class are so synonymous in
urban areas in the United States. That is, perhaps it is classism that drives changes in
police strength rather than (or in addition to) racist attitudes. Oliver and Mendelberg
(2000) support this contention in their study of racial attitudes in which they found
that differences in white racial antagonism across the South were not simply due to
the size of the African-American population, but shaped more by whites’ perception
of interracial economic competition. If this is true, then demands for stronger police
may stem from responses to the economic context in urban places.
This contention aligns with conflict theories that equate political power with
wealth in modern society. A concentration of income gives elites greater control over
political decision-making including those related to the social control (Chambliss,
1976), and when inequality is high, the rich enjoy the benefit of increased political
power relative to the poor (Jacobs & Helms, 1997). These theories would suggest that
such an unequal social arrangement cannot be maintained without a social control
apparatus that favors the rich at the expense of the poor. The affluent, therefore,
should use their political power to maintain their social position. One way this can be
achieved is by promoting social control functions that control the poor. The police,
who typically focus on public street crime in poor neighborhoods (Rubenstein, 1973;
Wilson, 1971), serve to accomplish this function. And the rich have an additional
reason to demand a strong police force. Fear of street crime (independent of the
likelihood of actual victimization) may contribute to their desire to maintain or
increase the size of the police.
Some empirical studies on police strength have tested whether economic stratifi-
cation is an important determinant of police size and results vary, probably because
these studies used a variety of measures of economic inequality. For example,
McCarty et al. (2012) used unemployment and per capita income to measure eco-
nomic inequality and found that the former was not a significant predictor of police
strength in U.S. cities but the latter had a negative effect. Zhao et al. (2012) also
assessed inequality using unemployment rates and found similarly surprising nega-
tive effects on the rate of police employees. Holmes et al. (2008) used a race-based
measure of inequality and found that Southwestern cities with a larger gap between
Hispanic and white median income had higher levels of police strength, though they
found no effect of the African-American to white median income. Finally, Stucky
(2005), and Stults and Baumer (2007) used the Gini index of income inequality to
predict police strength. The former found an implausible negative effect on police
strength in large U.S. cities while the latter found no effect. Despite the
variation in findings, based on theoretical expectations, and because so many
studies highlights the role of inequality regardless of its specification, we
include it in our analysis with the expectation that: As the overall economic
inequality of a city increases, police size will increase.
Additional Factors
Crime and Social Disorganization While the size of police forces should depend
partly on the amount of crime, the empirical research supporting this association is
quite mixed. Some find no evidence for a relationship between crime rates and police
strength (Loftin & McDowall, 1982; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; McCarty et al., 2012) but
a few do support this link (Bordua & Haurek 1971; Gurr, 1979; Liska et al., 1981;
Jacobs & Helms, 1997). These inconsistencies are largely due to variations in the
measure of crime, time periods and units of analysis, however, theory and
convention suggest that this relationship is important so we include serious
crime rates in all of our analyses and predict that cities with higher crime rates
will have larger police departments.
While a link between officially-reported crime rates and police strength is plausi-
ble, police administrators and the public may perceive an increased need for law
enforcement in socially disorganized places. Police must attend to issues related to
general social disorder that are common in disadvantaged urban communities. But
these calls for service, responses to unsupervised juveniles, and other common
policing activities are not captured by official crime statistics. Prior studies have
included a variety of control measures to account for this unmeasured disorder. We
employ the percentage of female-headed households and predict that cities with a
high proportion of female headed households will have more police.
Other Controls We include three additional controls that have been shown to con-
tribute to police strength. First, large police forces require ample finances (Stucky,
2005; Holmes et al., 2008; McCarty et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012). Kent and
Jacobs (2005) suggest that a city’s tax base is a good indication of available
funding for law enforcement agencies which may translate into more police.
Second, maintaining order is more difficult in places with large populations
(Hahn, 1971) so larger communities should require more police per capita
(Bordua & Haurek, 1971, Maguire, 2001).
Finally, some of the literature on social control agencies has established a link
between high unemployment rates and greater levels of social control (c.f. Sutton,
2000; Chiricos & Delone, 1992) based on the neo-Marxist claim that social control
mechanisms such as imprisonment are used to control a surplus of labor in capitalist
economies (Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939). This finding is consistent with the eco-
nomic threat argument that more police are necessary to control a potential criminal
threat posed by the unemployed. Recent studies on police strength have produced
mixed findings with some finding a positive effect of unemployment (Kent & Jacobs,
2005), others finding no effect (McCarty et al., 2012) and one finding a negative effect
(Zhao et al., 2012). Consistent with the predicted effect of enhanced economic inequal-
ity, we expect that cities with high unemployment may have larger police forces.
Methodology
The Sample and Dependent Variable
To test the hypotheses outlined above, we compiled a time-series dataset to include
decennial census data on 170 cities in the United States between 1980 and 2010. The
170 cities in our sample are those with over 100,000 residents as recorded in the 1980
census. We employ this particular sampling strategy for two reasons. First, to
maintain consistency across each panel we chose a population threshold defined in
our first panel. Without doing so, our analyses would be complicated by a different
sample size for each panel. We use a population of 100,000 residents as the lower-
limit of our sample because we are particularly interested in how major urban cities in
the country employ social control in response to our theoretically derived set of
factors. We assume different mechanisms are a play in smaller communities. While
previous studies of police strength have varied in the population threshold used to
capture urban centers, most have used cities with over 100,000 residents as their
sample. To remain consistent with the relevant studies, then, we use the same population
size for our sample of cities. Due to missing data for some of our variables, our sample
drops to 564 city-years for all of our multivariate regression analyses.
We confine our analysis to decennial census years because it has some
important advantages over, say, an annual series. First, most variables of
interest in our study are unavailable in off-census years. Some form of
interpolation could fill-in gaps in our data but even the most sophisticated
techniques introduce measurement error thereby degrading our estimates. To
avoid this outcome, we limit our analysis to census years. Long gaps
between panels have other advantages. Perhaps most importantly, space
between periods in a panel analysis can substantially reduce the risk of
serial correlation (see Johnston & Dinardo, 1997) which can bias coeffi-
cients. Finally, existing research on police strength has largely been confined
to census years (e.g. Greenberg & West, 2006; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001;
Kent & Jacobs, 2005). Thus, comparisons with findings from these studies
are more appropriate. Given these advantages, our findings will be compa-
rable to other studies and produce the most reliable estimates of the variation
in police strength.
The dependent variable is the rate of sworn police officers per 100,000
residents. This operationalization of police strength is consistent with most
other studies in the relevant literature (e.g. McCarty et al., 2012; Holmes et
al. (2008); Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Nalla et al., 1997). Measuring police
strength as a rate instead of raw numbers is the preferred measure because
it automatically accounts for the vast differences in population across cities
in our sample. Data for the dependent variable is taken from the Police
Employee data (LEOKA) contained in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).
Estimation
We run all of our regression models using a fixed-effects pooled time-series estima-
tion technique. Pooled time-series is preferred over a simple cross-sectional study
because it can capture both cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in police
strength. Using fixe-effects adds additional advantages over random-effects. The
principle strength of fixed-effects is that it automatically controls for all time-
invariant city-level factors that are not included in the model. Thus, fixed-effects
allows us to make greater claims that factors not included in our analysis such as
cultural differences, political arraignments or police culture are taken into account
and therefore not biasing our results. Given this substantial advantage fixed-effects
has over random-effects, recent studies on police strength have all used fixed-effects
(McCarty et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012; Kent & Jacobs, 2005). But fixed-effects
models are not always appropriate unless tests suggest it produces the most consistent
estimates. In our case, the Hausman test suggests that fixed-effects is preferred
and will produce the most reliable results (see Greene, 2012 for elaboration).
Findings from this test suggest that the error term for each city is not correlated
with other cities. Thus, each city contains unique characteristics that may
influence the outcome. Fixed-effects models can account for these unobserved
differences but random-effects cannot.
Our modeling strategy also includes an assessment of the shifts in police strength
over time as well as an examination of the strength of specific relationship across
time-periods. To accomplish this, all of our models include a set of dummy variables
to account for each decennial census panel. In some models, we also include an
interaction term between time and residential segregation. By using period interac-
tions, we can ascertain how the influence of residential segregation may have
changed over the last several decades. Finally, we include a correction for unspecified
heteroskedasticity in all of our models to ensure our models are robust and consistent
in the face of potential problems with the error variance.
Measurement
Data for the explanatory variables was largely taken from each decennial census from
1980 to 2010. We gauge the extent of residential segregation in each city with the
index of dissimilarity. This commonly used measure of residential segregation in-
dicates the odds that an African American will come into contact with a White person
by taking into account the geographic concentration of each group within census
blocks. The index ranges from zero (no racial residential segregation—i.e. all blocks
have same racial composition as the entire city) to 100 (complete residential
segregation—i.e. no census block has mixed racial composition). A number of
alternative measures of segregation exist but the index we use is the most often used
in criminal justice research so using the index of dissimilarity will make our results
more comparable to other studies (see Messner & Golden, 1992 for a detailed
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of our measure of segregation
as well as alternative measures). We include a squared term of segregation in
some models to test hypotheses derived from contact hypothesis which suggest
that relationship between segregation and police strength may be non-linear.
We measure racial threat as the percentage of African Americans in each city.
Ethnic threat is operationalized with the percentage Hispanic. In some models, we
also introduce a squared term for each of these threat variables to see if more political
versions of the threat hypothesis apply to police strength. An economic version of the
threat hypothesis is assessed using a pair of indicator. Unfortunately, there has been a
great deal of inconsistency in the measurement of income inequality in the extent
literature. Scholars have used any number of measures to assess the level of economic
stratification within a society including unemployment rates, poverty rates, income
differences by racial group, but the most conventional measure has been the Gini
index (for a detailed discussion of the index see Land, McCall, & Cohen, 1990; Kelly,
2000; Pratt & Cullen, 2005). The advantage of the Gini index is that it is widely
available, uncomplicated to calculate and interpretation is straightforward.
Additionally, one of the few studies to test the influence of income inequality on
police strength (Stucky, 2005) used the Gini index as the measure so the results from
our studies should be easily comparable. The Gini index ranges from zero (perfect
equality—i.e. income is spread equally across all individuals) to 1.0 (perfect
inequality—i.e. one household holds all the income). The extent of unemploy-
ment is an alternative measure on economic threat. To account for the possi-
bility that this is a better means of capturing economic stratification we include
the unemployment rates in all of our models. We log the unemployment rate in
all of our models to correct for skewness.
We use several measures to operationalize differences in crime across the cities in
our sample. In some of our models we assess crime use the rate of serious crime.
Serious crime rates include both violent and property crime. To see if these types of
crime operate differently on police strength, we separate these crime rates in
some models. While flawed, these crime figures receive much media attention
so the public and city politicians would likely take their cues from these
statistics if they thought more police were needed. Each of these measures is
taken from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.
Finally, to be consistent with prior studies on police strength (Kent & Jacobs,
2005) we account for differences in each city’s fiscal capacity to spend on policing
using median household income. Household income acts as a proxy for the tax base
of the city. While alternative measures exist such as tax revenue or spending on
police, these factors may be manipulated at any time by local politicians. Using
household income as the proxy for resource differences is a better reflection of base
resource capacities available to each city. To assess social disorganization we include
the percentage divorced in some of our models.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the predicted directions, means, standard deviations, and ranges for
all of the variables in our analyses. These summary statistics evince the substantial
variation in the rate of police strength across space and time. While the average city in
our sample has 220 officers for every 100,000 residents, the rate of police presence is
as low as 85 in Sunnyvale California and as high as 806 in Washington, DC. Sizable
but less dramatic shifts have also taken place over time. In 1980 the average city
police department had 205 officers per 100,000 residents. This figure has increased to
a rate of 240 officers. The principle purpose of this study is to understand why such
vast differences exist in cities across the United States.
Other summary statistics are also worth discussing. Of particular interest are the
descriptive for residential segregation. We see that the average degree of racial
residential segregation across the 170 cities in our sample is 59.85. Conceptually,
the figure represents the percentage of African Americans who would have to change
their residence to a predominantly White neighborhood in order to achieve a racial
distribution similar to the city as a whole (see Massey & Denton 1989 for
discussion). In other words, nearly 60 % of African Americans in each of
the 170 cities would have to move to a predominately White neighborhood to
achieve racial integration. But residential segregation varies substantially across
our sample from a low of 19.89 in Eugene, Oregon to a staggering high of
92.8 in Livonia, Michigan located just outside of Detroit.
Finally, the descriptive statistics identify substantial differences in minority pres-
ence across cities. It is clear from these statistics that both African Americans and
Hispanics are geographically concentrated into specific cities in the United States and
are nearly absent from others. In Livonia, Michigan the percentage African American
is less than one. This should not be surprising given the discussion on residential
segregation outlined above. Conversely, in Gary Indiana the African American
population is 84 % of the overall population. The Hispanic population is similarly
concentrated into certain urban centers in the United States. Over 90 % of the
population in Hialeah, Florida, for instance, is Hispanic. Yet, some cities are nearly
devoid of Hispanics (e.g. less than one percent in Jackson Mississippi). Beyond the
geographic concentration of minorities, perhaps even more interesting is the growth
in this population across major U.S. cities. While the African American population in
our sample of cities grew from 19.1 % in 1980 to over 25 % in 2010, the Hispanic
population exploded from 9.1 % to 21.6 % during the same time period (representing
Table 1 Means and standard deviations over time and across cities (n=564 City-years)
Variable Predicted direction Mean SD Min Max
Sworn police per 100,000 220.53 87.73 85.35 805.57
Residential segregation NL 59.85 15.83 19.89 92.8
% Black NL 20.50 17.49 .08 84.03
% Hispanic NL 14.55 16.66 .37 94.7
Serious crime rate + 7714.60 3123.8 1825.13 19235.97
Violent crime rate + 957.48 646.2 126.05 4353
Property crime rate + 6776.23 2751.4 1430.54 23517.98
Income inequality (GINI) + .44 .05 .28 .63
Logged unemployment rate + 1.86 .52 .26 2.99
Median family income + 37,401 16,941 11989 102943
% Female headed families + 26.01 10.38 .02 53.18
a 233 % increase). Our multivariate analyses will allow us to see if these changes in
the racial and ethnic composition have influenced the size of municipal police
departments across the United States.
Multivariate Results
Results from our pooled time-series analysis are presented in Table 2. Our first model
presents the findings from a smaller set of variables. This model does not include the
non-linear specification of our racial and ethnic threat variable and ignores any of the
period interaction terms. Model 2 considers the possibility that residential segregation
as well both threat variables have a non-linear relationship with police strength. The
third model examines an alternative specification for crime by examining property
and violent crime rates separately rather than the combined crime rates estimated in
the previous two models. The third model also introduces the remaining control for
family instability (the percentage of households that are female-headed). Our final
model removed the squared term for residential segregation so we can appropriately
assess interaction terms between each period and segregation.
Findings from Model 1 show that, despite conventional wisdom, the rate of serious
crime does not influence police strength across large U.S. cities. If differences in
crime rates are not responsible for differences in the size of municipal police de-
partments, what factors are? Our initial model provides some answers to this ques-
tion. It appears that the most residentially segregated cites and those with the most
Blacks have higher rates of police strength but, despite our predictions, Hispanic
presence does not reach significance in this early model. Additionally, differences in
economic inequality also appear to be playing a strong role in determining the size of
local police departments. Together, these results point to a link between police
strength and specific contextual factors such as a city’s racial composition, the extent
to which racial minorities are residentially isolated, and the degree of income
inequality within those cities. But theory suggests the relationship between several
of our contextual variables may not be linear. Model 2 tests these assumptions.
The results from Model 2 support our expectation about the non-linearity of
several key variables. First, we see that the relationship between racial residential
segregation and the size of police forces is non-linear such that it takes the shape of an
inverted U. Consistent with our hypotheses, it appears that as African Americans
become more segregated into specific neighborhoods within a city there are increases
in the size of municipal police departments but this rate of increase diminishes at
higher levels of segregation. We will discuss this relationship in more detail below. A
city’s racial and ethnic compositions are also associated with police force size in a
non-linear fashion. As expected from the more political version of threat hypotheses,
cities with a larger African American presence have a greater police presence but the
effect diminishes, leveling off at higher proportions of racial minorities. Aside from
these findings, we see that income inequality is an important predictor of police
strength but the serious crime rate does not account for shifts in our outcome.
It could be that local politicians respond to different types of crimes when
considering police force size. We examine this possibility along with another
control variable that considers the influence of social disorganization on police
strength. Model 3 separates the serious crime rates into its two principal
Table 2 Fixed-effects, pooled time-series regression estimates of the rate of sworn police officers in large
U.S. cities (1980–2010)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Residential segregation
Segregation .700** 1.938** 1.921** .351
(.283) (.703) (.685) (.323)
Segregation Squared – −.011* −.011* –
(.006) (.006)
Racial/Economic threat variables
% Black 3.644*** 5.127*** 5.801*** 5.842***
(.739) (1.185) (1.263) (1.169)
% Black squared – −.023* −.033** −.035**
(.013) (.013) (.013)
% Hispanic −.312 −1.458* −1.086* −1.121*
(.296) (.724) (.599) (.597)
% Hispanic squared – .016* .013* .015*
(.009) (.007) (.008)
Gini index 185.263* 188.959* 154.180* 151.278+
(90.469) (92.793) (92.551) (95.508)
Logged unemployment rate .486 1.014 −1.089 .026
(5.232) (5.227) (5.573) (5.528)
Year dummies (1980 is omitted category)
1=1990 8.388 5.185 19.150 12.936
(9.646) (9.611) (11.543) (22.942)
1=2000 23.378+ 20.943 28.979* −6.116
(13.493) (13.418) (13.795) (25.137)
1=2010 14.390 11.015 27.504 −31.972
(17.871) (17.215) (19.071) (27.311)
Control variables
Serious crime rate .002 .001 – –
(.001) (.001)
Violent crime rate – – −.011 −.007
(.007) (.007)
Property crime rate – – .004* .004*
(.002) (.002)
Median income .000 .000 .001* .001**
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
% Female headed households – – .915** 1.056***
(.334) (.332)
Interaction terms
Segregation*1990 – – – .032
(.318)
Segregation*2000 – – – .515*
(.289)
components—violent crime and property crime. With these rates separated, we
find some support for the conventional explanation associated with the variation
in police strength. Specifically, we see that violent crime rates are not signif-
icantly related to our outcome but property crime rates do have a positive and
significant effect. It is plausible that city managers respond to shifts in property
crimes because the vast majority of overall crime is property crime. In addition
to the significant effect of property crime, Model 3 also shows that the
hypothesis derived from social disorganization theory is also supported. Our
measure of family disruption is a positive and significant predictor of police
strength. It is noteworthy that the variables included in Model 3 account for
over 90 % of the variation in the variation in the size of municipal police
departments across the United States. Before we summarize our findings,
though, we will elaborate on our results related to residential segregation.
A Closer Look at Residential Segregation
Our second and third models show that the relationship between racial residential
segregation and the size of local police departments is non-linear in the shape of an
inverted U. To illustrate this relationship, Fig. 1 plots the association between
segregation and the outcome. From this depiction, we see that the rate of police
strength is the lowest in the most integrated cities. This is consistent with expectations
derived from the contact hypothesis. However, as racial threat theory would predict
when racial minorities become more segregated into isolated neighborhoods we see a
rise in police strength. According to threat hypotheses, this increase in social control
is a function of an increase in fears toward minorities. Though in our sample, very
few cities have extreme levels of segregation, the figure illustrates that at the highest
levels of segregation, police strength begins to diminish, because, perhaps as Blalock
(1967) surmised, segregation serves to isolate African-Americans from whites, re-
ducing interracial contact and perceived threat.
But because our series covers several decades and major societal shift have taken
place during this period, a number of contextual and cultural factors may have
changed with regards to their influence on the size of municipal police departments.
In particular, some scholars have suggested that race relations in the United States are
declining in their significance (e.g. Wilson, 1978). If this is the case, we should
Table 2 (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Segregation*2010 – – – 1.008***
(.311)
Constant −3.881 −45.270 −84.061 −40.063
# of City-Years 564 564 564 564
Adj. R2 .902 .903 .907 .909
+ P≤ .1; *P≤ .05; **P≤ .01; ***P≤ .001. One-tailed tests on all coefficients except the decade dummies and
the unemployment rate. Robust (corrected for heteroskedasticity) Standard Errors are in parentheses. All
models corrected for unspecified heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) correction
expect to see factors related to race have a diminishing influence on social control
outcomes. To test this possibility our final model in Table 2 examines a set of
interaction terms between the level of racial residential segregation and the period
dummies. Despite predictions to the contrary, the results from Model 4 indicate that
the influence of racial segregation on police strength has increased in each decade
since 1980. This finding suggests that levels of racial segregation not only continue to
play a substantial role in determining the size of local police departments, the
influence of the isolation of minorities on police strength is on the rise.
Conclusion
Findings
A rather significant body of literature which examines the variation in the size of local
police departments has accumulated over the last few decades (see Sever, 2001 for a
review of many of these studies). Yet, given the scholarly interest in this topic, it is
surprising that no previous study has paid significant attention to the potentially
significant role that racial segregation may have on variations in police strength. The
goal of this study has been to fill this void in the extant literature. The analysis not
only examines differences in police strength across a large sample of the largest 170
cities in the United States, it also explores factors that have led to changes in rates of
police presence over the last several decades. Our results provide consistent evidence
that after controlling for differences in crime rates and population size, several
contextual factors have contributed to the size of municipal police departments.
A few of our results are particularly noteworthy as they provide important insight
into the variations in police strength across large U.S. cities. Perhaps our most novel
finding is the relationship between racial residential inequality and our outcome
measure. After testing both the linear and non-linear specification, our analyses
suggest that the relationship is best understood as curvilinear. As Fig. 1 shows, the
most integrated cities have smaller police departments per 100,000 residents. This is
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Fig. 1 Plot of the relationship between segregation and police strength
decline when members of different ethnic groups live in the same neighborhood. This
is believed to be the case because negative stereotypes are reduced when equal-status
contact occurs between different racial or ethnic groups (see Ellison &Powers 1994
for elaboration). Scholars suggest that contact between different groups exposes them
to the similarities in their attitudes, behaviors and in doing so decreases traditional
stereotypes. So, to the extent that majority group members are threatened by a large
minority population, this fear appears to reduce with contact.
Yet, we see from our results that once interracial contact begins to decline, threat
associated with minority groups appears to rise (as evinced by greater levels of social
control). This increase is consistent with the expectations of both traditional threat
theories as well as the contact hypothesis. At the highest level of segregation, Fig. 1
shows that there is a diminishing effect associated with segregation. It seems plau-
sible that majority group members are less threatened in cities where Blacks are the
most residentially isolated. Under these conditions, residential segregation may make
formal control efforts less necessary because the risk of interracial crime drops
substantially. Furthermore, the examination of interactions between segregation and
the decade dummies show that the strength of this association has only increased over
time despite the substantial strides made in race relations in the United States.
In addition to our findings associated with residential segregation, our results also
point to other important contextual factors related to police strength. In particular,
social threat explanations received great support from in our analyses. Consistent
with most previous studies, racial and ethnic threat are each consistent, robust
predictors of the size of municipal police departments (e.g. Stucky, 2005; Jacobs &
Kent, 2005; see Sever, 2001 for a review). Our findings are somewhat novel, though,
as we test and find support for a non-linear relationship between the threat measures
and police strength. Most studies only consider a direct relationship (see Stucky, 2005
and Sever, 2001 for exceptions) but both theory (Blalock 1967) and empirical
evidence (Jackson, 1989) suggests that these relationships are non-linear. Results
suggest that as African American presence grows there is a diminishing effect on
police strength. The size of the police department grows along with the size of the
Black population but once their representation reaches about 10 % of the overall city
population, police strength levels off then slowly declines. This is consistent with a
political version of the threat hypothesis advanced by Jackson (1989) who argues that
with a sizable presence, African Americans gain political influence and with such
clout appear to be able to reduce discriminatory crime control tactics they perceive as
largely directed at members of their own group.
Similarly, our findings indicate that police strength increases as the size of the
Hispanic population grows. Unlike our results for African Americans, though, it
appears that metropolitan police departments grow at an increasing rate as the
Hispanic population expands. This is consistent with traditional threat explana-
tions which suggest that minority presence increases majority group fears. It is
not clear, though, why police strength does not decline as the Hispanic popu-
lation increases. Perhaps Hispanics have not been able to successfully translate
their growing numbers into political influence in the same ways that African
Americans have. In any case, future research will have to examine this rela-
tionship further as the Hispanic population expands further in cities across the
United States.
Finally, our findings provided strong support for an economic version of the threat
hypothesis. Despite the well-established connection between income inequality and
the use of social control (e.g. Jacobs & Helms, 2001; Arvanites & Asher, 1998),
most studies looking at police strength have ignored this relationship. Our
results show that income inequality is one of the strongest determinants of
variation in police strength across U.S. cities in the last several decades. Those
cities where economic inequality is high have the most police officers. Future
studies would be ill-advised to ignore this factor.
Wider Implications
Theorists have long argued that racial residential segregation is one of the most
persistent and consequential elements of racial inequality in the United States
(Quilian & Pager, 2001; Peterson & Krivo, 1993, Massey & Denton, 1987). It has
been associated with numerous social problems including joblessness (Wilson 1978),
poverty (Krivo, Peterson, Rizzo & Reynolds, 1998), and levels of crime (Peterson &
Krivo, 1993). Beyond these social ills, theorists have also pointed to the connection
between social control and segregation. In particular, both Spitzer (1975) and Blauner
(1972) argued that at its highest levels, residential segregation acts as a means of
social control that reduces the need for alternative measures such as police protection.
Scholars suggest that the residential segregation of racial or ethnic minorities reduces
interethnic contact and therefore the likelihood of interethnic victimization (South &
Felson, 1990; Messner & South, 1986; Blau, 1977). Declines in real or perceived
threats from minorities may then reduce perceptions of a crime problem and the
demands for aggressive crime control efforts that go with such fears.
The contact hypothesis develops our understanding of the association between
levels of segregation and the use of formal social control by suggesting that
interethnic contact can reduce negative stereotypes and their potential consequences
(Sigelman & Welch, 1993). Williams (1964) argued that intimate and consistent
contact such as that which takes place between neighbors is particularly successful
at reducing racial animosities. If majority group members are less afraid of victim-
ization from minorities it stands to reason that they will be less likely to demand
aggressive social control measures. Our findings support such a claim. The most
racially integrated cities have the smallest police departments after controlling for
numerous other factors such as differences in crime rates. Yet, consistent with
traditional explanations, police strength increases as segregation increases. In the
most segregated cities, though, the size of the municipal police department levels off
then declines. This drop-off is consistent with claims by Spitzer (1975) and Blauner
(1972) that at high level, racial isolation acts as a form of social control.
Beyond residential segregation, it appears that racial and ethnic composition of a
city has a direct effect on the size of local police departments. This is consistent with
numerous theoretical claims that the size of the minority population is related to
majority group fears and that these fears will translate into greater demands for more
aggressive crime control measures (Blalock, 1972). There has been a substantial
increase in both the African American and Hispanic populations across the United
States since 1980. It appears that this growth has influenced the decision-making of
local politicians when they consider the need for police officers.
Theoretical claims that economic concentration produces an unstable condition
that must be maintained by force are also supported here (Chambliss & Seidman,
1980). Cities with large economic differences between the affluent and the poor have
substantially larger police departments. This is consistent with the idea that social
control efforts such as police protection are principally a tool used to protect and
sustain current social arrangements that benefit the affluent (Collins, 1975; Lenski,
1966). To reiterate, it is important to see both the racial and economic threat findings as
part of a larger political process since successful demands for increases in social control
must be directed at public officials who canmanipulate law enforcement presence. Thus,
the threat of a large minority population or the threat of a large underclass must generate
pressure on local politicians to increase levels of social control.
Together, our results suggest that, despite claims to the contrary (Wilson, 1978),
racial inequality continues to play a strong role in determining the magnitude of
crime-control measures across the United States. Despite conventional expectations,
differences in population and crime that exist between cities are not the primary
drivers of variation in the size of municipal police departments. Rather, our results
support neo-Marxist claims that crime control is best seen as an instrument in the
struggle between dominant and subordinate group members (Garland, 1990;
Quinney, 1974; Turk, 1969). But our results also point to strategies that may eliminate
or reduce this struggle. As discussed above, the most integrated communities have the
fewest officers on the street presumably because dominant group members hold less
prejudicial attitudes towards racial and ethnic minorities in these cities. Thus, policies
aimed at reducing racial and ethnic isolation in urban cities should reduce police
strength across the United States.
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